



Using GConf as an Example of How to Create an Userspace Object Manager



James Carter

jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov

National Security Agency

National Information Assurance Research Laboratory
(NIARL)



Background - SELinux



- Flask architecture
 - Security server
 - Object managers
 - Access vector caches (AVCs)
- Object Managers
 - Bind security labels to their objects
 - Query the security server for labeling and access decisions
 - Enforce the security decisions of the security server



Background - GConf



- Configuration system for GNOME
 - Not GNOME specific
- Stores configuration data for programs
- Provides change notification to programs




GConf Architecture



- Configuration sources
- Client library
- Per-user configuration server
- ORBit
 - CORBA



GConf Operation





Configuration Sources



- Data: Key-value pairs
- Metadata: expected type, default value, description
- Accessed through a backend



Client Library



- Interface to access the configuration sources
- Caches configuration values
- Allows a specific set of configuration sources to be specified
- Works with the configuration server to notify the client when the value of a registered key changes



Per-user Configuration Server



- Accesses the configuration sources through the appropriate backend
- Presents a unified set of configuration data to the client
- Notifies the client library of all clients effected when the value of a key changes



Providing Security Controls over a Program



- Adequate control is often achieved by merely running an application in the domain of its parent.
- If not, then either:
 - The application should not be run
 - The security goals of the system reduced to allow the program to run, or
 - Security controls must be added



Four Strategies for Adding Security Controls over a Program



- Add SELinux policy for the program
- Add additional or finer-grained controls to SELinux
- Re-architect the program to make use of existing SELinux controls
- Modify the program to become an userspace object manager



Add SELinux Policy



- Does not require modification of the program
 - Least obtrusive strategy
- May be able to use the policy for another program with similar functions
- Custom policy involves:
 - Specifying the security label the process will run in
 - Labeling security-relevant objects
 - Specifying rules for the process and objects to interact with each other and the rest of the system



Add Additional Features to SELinux



- Add additional or finer-grained SELinux kernel controls
- SELinux is meant to have comprehensive controls over kernel objects, so new kernel controls shouldn't be required often
- If new controls are written, then new policy is needed to take advantage of those controls



Re-Architect the Program



- Decompose a program into a small, privileged process and a larger, unprivileged process
- Run multiple copies of the program in different domains
- Rewrite the program



Creating an Userspace Object Manager



- SELinux provides object managers for kernel objects
- New object managers are needed for any object not controlled by the kernel
- Natural part of implementing the Flask architecture on Linux



Functions of an Userspace Object Manager



- Bind security labels to the objects that it controls
- Request labeling and access decisions from the appropriate security server
- Enforce the decisions returned by the security server



Trust Required of an Userspace Object Manager



- Only trusted to control its objects
- Not trusted in all of its operations
- Still controlled by the system's security policy



Steps in Creating an Userspace Object Manager



- Identify the objects in greater detail
- Provide a way to uniquely and reliably label the object
- Add access checks and labeling requests where needed to control the object
- Make the subject's label available at the access checks



Steps in Creating an Userspace Object Manager (Cont)



- Add an access vector cache (AVC) to the program to cache the access decisions of the security server
- Create new SELinux policy classes and permissions as needed
- Create SELinux policy to control the objects



What Needs to be Secured in GConf



- Configuration sources
- Key-value pairs
- ORBit IORs



Adding SELinux Policy to Secure GConf



- Only the configuration server can access or modify the configuration data of the user
- Cannot label the configuration data itself



Strategies Not Used to Secure GConf



- Add additional features to SELinux
 - Configuration data of GConf is only visible to the configuration server at the appropriate granularity
- Re-Architect GConf
 - Some advantages, more disadvantages



GConf Needs to be an Userspace Object Manager



- Using the other strategies, some progress has been made
- Configuration data still not adequately controlled
- Configuration data is only visible at the right level to the configuration server
- The configuration server must be made into an userspace object manager



Labeling the Configuration Data



- Security labels stored in a separate namespace
 - /selinux
- Security labels are normal GConf value strings
- Namespace protected by requiring special functions to directly access security labels
- Security label always chosen from the default configuration sources



Adding Labeling Requests and Access Checks



- Access checks are done before an operation on the configuration data
 - For server-side notification registration, the check is done sooner
 - For querying all keys in a directory or all directories in a directory, the check is done after
- Labeling request is done on a set operation if the key doesn't already have a security context



Making the Client's Security Context Available



- Would like to get it from the kernel
 - Can't because the client and server communicate through ORBit
- Would like to get it from a process that the server trusts
 - Modifying ORBit to provide the context would be a lot of work
 - If D-Bus replaces ORBit, then it would be easier
- Actually trusts the client to provide the context



Add an Access Vector Cache (AVC)



- Provided by the library libselinux
- Start the AVC when the configuration server starts
- Used GConf specific memory allocation, logging, and audit callback functions



Create New SELinux Policy Class and Permissions



- Security class
 - gconf
- Permissions
 - get_value, set_value, create_value, remove_value, get_meta, set_meta, relabel_from, relabel_to



Create SELinux Policy to Control Objects



- Sensitive keys must be identified and labeled
- Processes that need to have different accesses to configuration data must run in different domains
 - Currently, most user processes run in on domain
- Only policy to test for proper operation has been written at this time



Conclusions



- Questions?