SELinux Symposium



Symposium Committees

Previous Meetings
2007 Symposium
2006 Symposium
2005 Symposium
2004 Meeting


Sponsorship opportunities

Contact Us


Joshua Guttman

Joshua Guttman and John Ramsdell have long been involved in applying rigorous techniques to compiler correctness and information security. In the early 1990s, they collaborated together with Wand, Swarup, and Oliva on the Vlisp project; it was the first comprehensive verification of the design of a Scheme compiler and run-time environment, or indeed any programming language in actual use. More recently, they have worked on analyzing the information flows permitted by SELinux policies. This has led to methods for analyzing existing policies and generating policies covering new applications. Their paper on the SELinux Analysis Tools (SLAT) will appear in the Journal of Computer Security early in 2005.

Dr. Guttman heads MITRE's research program in Information Assurance, and publishes frequently on rigorous security management, cryptographic protocol analysis, and trust management. He holds degrees from the University of Chicago and Princeton University.

Dr. Ramsdell works on security for computer-based collaboration programs and their underlying protocols as well as operating system security and cryptographic protocols and their applications. He holds degrees from Harvard University and Cornell University.
©Copyright 2005-2006 SELinux Symposium, LLC
Privacy Statement