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Trent Jaeger

Trent Jaeger is a Research Staff Member at the IBM T. J. Watson Research Center. He works in the Network Security Department where he is the project lead of Linux Security Analysis project which investigates the development of systems and engineering tools to improve the security of Linux. Trent's research interests include access control, security analysis tools, and operating systems. He has published over 50 refereed research papers on these subjects. Also, he has been a member of the program committee, including as Program and General Chair, for several major security conferences. Trent has an M.S. and a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor in Computer Science and Engineering in 1993 and 1997, respectively.

Trent has been conducting research using the Linux Security Modules (LSM) framework and the SELinux module for several years. He develop source code verification tools to verify that the place of LSM hooks mediates all security-sensitive operations for the expected authorizations. A tool for such analysis, called Vali, was released to the open source community. Trent maintains an interest in the evolution of the LSM framework to control network communication and its effective use by SELinux modules, as he discusses in the SELinux Symposium in his talk "Leveraging IPSec for network access control for SELinux."

Trent has also been active in researching approaches to designing manageable SELinux policies. Trent proposed an approach where information flow constraints are used as a target to design towards, so the basic goal is clear an exceptions are explicit and are handled exceptionally. The closest analogue for such an approach among classical models is the Clark-Wilson integrity model, and Trent discusses how the design of SELinux policies can be guided by that model and the tools that are required in his SELinux Symposium talk "Applying Clark-Wilson integrity to SELinux policy design."
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